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REVIVING MAINE’S STATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROTECTION AGAINST UNREASONABLE 
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 
Jamesa J. Drake* 
ABSTRACT 
Whatever the merits of new judicial federalism, it has not translated well in practice.  
Doctrinal reasons are probably partly to blame, but utilitarian factors matter, too.  
Using the State of Maine as an example, this article develops a litigation roadmap 
specifically geared to overcoming the pragmatic reasons against reviving the 
protections embodied in the state constitution’s search and seizure clause.  This fills 
a gap in the existing literature, which often argues either for or against state 
constitutionalism, but neglects the most difficult part: explaining to practicing 
lawyers how to start a state constitutional dialogue with the court. 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES 
ME. CONST. art. I, § 5 
Unreasonable searches prohibited.  The people shall be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and possessions from all unreasonable searches and seizures; and no 
warrant to search any place, or seize any person or thing, shall issue without a special 
designation of the place to be searched, nor without probable cause—supported by 
oath or affirmation. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
INTRODUCTION 
In academic circles, the “rediscovery” of state constitutions as a source of 
individual rights—new judicial federalism—is well-plowed ground.1  But in 
practice, state constitutionalism is more theoretical than real.  This is especially true 
in criminal cases.  Empirical evidence suggests that nationwide, state courts rarely 
ground their criminal procedure decisions in state law and, when they do, the source 
of authority is overwhelmingly state court precedent, not state constitutional law.2   
                                                                                                     
 *  Adjunct Professor, University of Maine School of Law. 
 1.  ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 113-14. 
 2.  Michael Esler, State Supreme Court Commitment to State Law, 78 JUDICATURE 25, 28 (1994); 
Justin Long, Intermittent State Constitutionalism, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 41, 43 (2006) (“Scholars have devoted 
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There are myriad reasons why courts might eschew the application of state 
constitutional rights independent from the federal constitution.  Scholars have 
thoroughly vetted the doctrinal justifications: it destroys national unity, it creates 
complications and uncertainty, and it both evades Supreme Court rulings and 
encourages the Court to relinquish the field of civil rights, etc.3   
There are other utilitarian reasons, too.  At bottom, independent state 
constitutional interpretation requires a “resurgence of state court creativity”4 and 
judges must be receptive to “new opportunities for policymaking.”5  Elected judges 
find this terrifying; appointed judges probably do, too.  Empirical evidence shows 
that state courts “are significantly more likely to adopt dependent interpretations 
when judges face election, and significantly more likely to adopt independent 
interpretations when they do not.”6   
In the criminal procedure context, there is an additional complication: many of 
these cases involve “not very nice people.”7  Courts might have no difficulty 
interpreting their state constitutions in other contexts, for example when there is no 
federal constitutional analogue or when other types of individual rights are at issue.  
But, they might be especially resistant to expand individual rights at the expense of 
crime victims.   
Even within the criminal procedure ambit, certain case types are treated 
differently.  Search and seizure cases are the most difficult to win, and this is largely 
true regardless of whether the state or federal constitution is in play.  In the State of 
Maine, for example, the state constitution confers broader protection against self-
incrimination than the federal constitution.8  But, the state’s highest court has not 
said the same about the state constitution’s search and seizure clause; in the distant 
past, the court even hinted that the state constitution might confer less protection.9  
Although the court has never explained why, one reason for the distinction might be 
that coerced confessions are inherently unreliable.  In search and seizure cases, the 
evidence is reliable but excluded nonetheless.10  This creates the unsavory 
impression of a guilty man walking free on a legal technicality. 
                                                                                                     
little attention to explaining the gap between the seemingly logical and persuasive arguments for robust 
state constitutionalism in law reviews and the actual spotty performance of state constitutionalism in the 
courts.”). 
 3.  JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND 
DEFENSES § 1-3(d) (3d ed. 2000); see also, e.g., Francis Barry McCarthy, Counterfeit Interpretations of 
State Constitutions in Criminal Procedure, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 79, 80 (2007). 
 4.  See Mary Cornelia Porter & G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism and the Ohio Supreme 
Court: Anatomy of a Failure, 45 OHIO ST. L. J. 143, 158 (1984). 
 5.  See id. at 150. 
 6.  Katharine Goodloe, A Study in Unaccountability: Judicial Elections and Dependent State 
Constitutional Interpretations, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 749, 790 (2011). 
 7.  United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“It is a fair 
summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies 
involving not very nice people.”). 
 8.  State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d 1120, 1122 (Me. 1982). 
 9.  See State v. Fredette, 411 A.2d 65, 67 (Me. 1979). 
 10.  Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 790 n.125 
(1994). 
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When courts avoid constitutionalism for doctrinal reasons, and make those 
reasons known in their decisions, advocates understand what they are up against.  
But when courts avoid state constitutional interpretation for pragmatic reasons, those 
reasons may be left unsaid.  This makes it particularly difficult for advocates to know 
how to break the logjam.   
Using the search and seizure clause of the Maine Constitution as an example, 
this article explores the most difficult question in state constitutional decision 
making—how to begin—and offers a litigation roadmap for doing just that.  
Recently, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, signaled its 
willingness to consider whether the state constitution offers broader protection than 
the Fourth Amendment.11  The court may be readying itself to issue a “teaching 
opinion” that declares the state constitution’s search and seizure clause to be an 
independent force, and serves as a wake-up call to lawyers and lower courts.12  
Advocates must respond. 
The first step is understanding why Maine has eschewed the development of 
state constitutionalism, generally.  Ultimately, the answer is unsatisfactory, but 
probably typical of other jurisdictions.  There is no identifiable explanation—nothing 
one can point to in the case law—that explains the legal landscape.  This suggests 
that utilitarian or even mundane factors, such as the composition of the court, are to 
blame.  Although this means that advocates will have to shadowbox, the optimistic 
view is that future development of state constitutional search and seizure 
jurisprudence is possible. 
The next step is motivating the court to act and to disentangle the state and 
federal constitutions.  If a court is hesitant to do this, believing it smacks of judicial 
policymaking, then it should not worry.  A spade is a spade; in the search and seizure 
context, judicial policymaking is precisely what happens.  The outcome of nearly 
every Fourth Amendment case depends on amorphous notions of “reasonableness,” 
which by definition requires judges to either balance competing contemporary values 
or apply the results of that balancing done by some higher court.  Maine has adopted 
a “reasonableness” balancing approach for deciding state constitutional search and 
seizure issues—which is good.  The balancing approach allows Maine-specific 
concerns to matter in search and seizure cases, and there is no reason to presume that 
Mainers would object to this. 
The third step is to prove that Maine’s search and seizure clause is not 
“coextensive” with or “identical” to the Fourth Amendment.  This requires a hard 
look at the court’s search and seizure cases from the founding era through the present 
day.  These cases, and the general principles they embody, provide a springboard for 
                                                                                                     
 11.  See State v. Hutchinson, 2009 ME 44, ¶ 18 n.9, 969 A.2d 923 (“Although this provision and the 
corresponding provision in the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution generally offer 
identical protection, we have also recognized that the Maine Constitution may offer additional 
protections.”) (internal citations omitted); State v. Glover, 2014 ME 49, ¶ 10 n.2, 89 A.3d 1077. 
 12.  Robert F. Williams, The New Judicial Federalism in Ohio: The First Decade, 51 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 415, 418 (2004) (quoting Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court: Continuing 
Methodology and Legitimacy Problems in Independent State Constitutional Rights Adjudication, 72 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1015, 1019 (1997)). 
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crafting arguments tailored to specific cases.   
The article concludes by suggesting ways in which the court might ease its way 
back to an overall revival of state constitutional law.  If the court can be convinced 
to revive the state’s search and seizure clause, then this augurs well for other criminal 
procedure protections.   
I. 
Step 1:  Examine past attempts at independent state constitutional interpretation 
If Maine had a robust tradition of independent state constitutional interpretation, 
then the task would be much easier.  Advocates would simply argue that the court 
should extend its existing case law to the search and seizure context.  But that is not 
the case.  The current state of things is much more complex.  Maine flirted with new 
judicial federalism, but it never took root.  This section first examines what Maine 
has said about independent state constitutional interpretation generally, without 
regard to which provision of the constitution the court was considering.  This section 
concludes by offering possible explanations about why Maine seems resistant to 
announcing new or broader state constitutional protections.   
Two important caveats: first, the analysis that follows concerns Maine’s 
Declaration of Rights.  Maine’s constitution has many provisions with no federal 
constitutional analogue, and the Law Court has no difficulty interpreting those 
provisions;13 they play no role in the analysis in this section.  Second, Maine 
interpreted its entire constitution during the lengthy period between statehood and 
the incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the States.   Because the focus here is 
on what Maine has said about its constitution relative to the federal constitution, the 
analysis begins with mid- to late-twentieth century case law. 
A. Maine’s initial attempts at state constitutionalism, generally   
 In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court announced in Lego v. Twomey, that as a matter 
of Fifth Amendment law, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that a criminal defendant voluntarily confessed.14  The Court also 
acknowledged, however, that: “States are free, pursuant to their own law, to adopt a 
higher standard.  They may indeed differ as to the appropriate resolution of the values 
they find at stake.”15  In 1977, Justice Brennan urged as much in his influential article 
calling for a revival of state constitutional law.16  And in 1983, the Supreme Court 
reiterated in Michigan v. Long, that it is “fundamental that state courts be left free 
                                                                                                     
 13.  See, e.g., Morris v. Goss, 147 Me. 89, 97, 83 A.2d 556, 559-61 (1951) (regarding a constitutional 
challenge to a matter of state legislative procedure, the court wrote: “[W]e are now interpreting our own 
Constitution.  In so doing, we are not bound by any of the interpretations which other courts may have 
made of their own Constitutions.  Nor do we follow such interpretations except to the extent that the 
reasoning upon which they rest is convincing to us when applied to our Constitution.”). 
 14.  404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972). 
 15.  Id. at 489. 
 16.  See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. 
L. REV. 489, 502 (1977). 
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and unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitutions” and that it would not 
review “judgments of state courts that rest on adequate and independent state 
grounds.”17  These developments spurred the incubation period of new judicial 
federalism in Maine, which roughly runs from 1970 to 1990. 
The Law Court was quick to respond to the Supreme Court’s invitation to “adopt 
a higher standard” of protection under the Maine Constitution.  In 1972, the court 
cited Twomey, for the proposition that the federal constitution “prescribed a 
mandatory minimum standard”; it rejected the federal preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard; and it declared that the state constitution required proof of the 
voluntariness of a confession beyond a reasonable doubt.18  This was revolutionary. 
In 1973, the court held that the state constitution conferred a more expansive 
right to counsel in criminal cases than the federal constitution and it analyzed the 
textual, historical, and policy reasons for reaching a different result under the state 
constitution than the federal constitution.19  The opinion is infused with strong 
language about the Law Court’s “devotion to the Constitution of Maine” and its 
“grant of maximum freedom to the individual citizen”.20  Similar sentiment 
continued for the next several years.21   
In 1981, the court announced that the state constitutional protection against 
double jeopardy was “essentially like” the federal constitutional analogue.22  But that 
Maine would only “heed” the U.S. Supreme Court decisions “in two respects:” “as 
precedentially controlling . . . of the federal Constitution’s protection against double 
jeopardy” and “as most helpful guides regarding the scope of the protection against 
double jeopardy afforded by the Constitution of Maine.”23  
In 1982, the Law Court held that the state constitution conferred broader 
protections against involuntary confessions.  In State v. Caouette, the court instructed 
that “federal decisions do not serve to establish the complete statement of controlling 
law but rather to delineate a constitutional minimum or universal mandate for the 
federal control of every State.”24  The court emphasized that in criminal cases, 
voluntariness “must be decided by this Court—as a matter of Maine law.”25 
In 1984, the Law Court adopted a framework—the primacy approach—for 
deciding state constitutional questions.  In State v. Cadman, another case about 
speedy trial guarantees, the court explained that “judicial restraint moves us to 
forbear from ruling on federal constitutional issues before consulting our state 
                                                                                                     
 17.  See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) (quoting Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 
U.S. 551, 557 (1940)). 
 18.  State v. Collins, 297 A.2d 620, 626-27 (Me. 1972) (emphasis in the original). 
 19.  State v. Sklar, 317 A.2d 160, 163-72 (Me. 1974). 
 20.  Id. at 171. 
 21.  See, e.g., Danforth v. State Dep’t of Health and Welfare, 308 A.2d 794, 795 (Me. 1973) (holding 
that the Maine Constitution confers greater right-to-counsel protection than the federal constitution in 
child protective custody cases).  
 22.  State v. Howes, 432 A.2d 419, 423 (Me. 1981). 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d 1120, 1122 (Me. 1982). 
 25.  Id.  
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constitution.”26  The court also explained that: 
There is no deprivation of an accused’s Fourteenth Amendment rights when we 
determine that he has a remedy under our state constitution.  It is only when . . . his 
claim under the state constitution fails . . . that we must then examine his conviction 
from a standpoint of federal constitutional law.27 
In 1985, the Law Court again applied the primacy approach and instructed in State 
v. Flick, that:  
[W]e may use . . . Supreme Court opinions as ‘helpful guides’ to the underlying 
policy of both double jeopardy provisions, but our citation to those opinions should 
not be read as an acknowledgement that federal law requires the result we reach, nor 
to diminish our view of the independent sufficiency of article I, section 8 as the basis 
for decision.28 
Presently, this is the high water mark for state constitutionalism in Maine. 
After Flick, and without obvious explanation, the court’s enthusiasm for state 
constitutional interpretation abruptly ended.  The court’s own comfort level with 
state constitutional decision making cooled, for reasons left unsaid. 
About a month after the Law Court decided Flick, it was confronted with the 
question of whether an obscenity ordinance was vague or overbroad in violation of 
the state and federal constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and due 
process.29  In City of Portland v. Jacobsky, the court began its analysis by reiterating 
the primacy approach.30  But then it admonished: “Any difference in language 
between the Maine Constitution and the United States Constitution is, in the context 
of this case, insufficient to justify striking out on our own to develop a unique answer 
to the difficult definitional problem that has been long and often litigated under the 
First Amendment.”31  The court added: “It is unnecessary for us to declare, and we 
intimate no opinion whatsoever, whether in every case that may arise this provision 
of article I, section 4, and its federal counterpart will be found coextensive.”32   
This was markedly different than what the court had said previously.  In the early 
1980s, the Law Court instructed that United States Supreme Court case law was only 
a “helpful guide” for determining the breadth of state constitutional guarantees.33   
The court had specifically declared that the “vigor” of Maine constitutional 
                                                                                                     
 26.  State v. Cadman, 476 A.2d 1148, 1150 (Me. 1984). 
 27.  Id.; see also State v. Larrivee, 479 A.2d 347, 349 (Me. 1984) (The state constitution “has been 
the primary protector of the fundamental liberties of Maine people since statehood was achieved.  If we 
conclude that [a criminal defendant’s] claim . . . fails, we must then examine the failure to suppress from 
a standpoint of federal constitutional law.”); State v. Rowe, 480 A.2d 778, 781-83 (Me. 1984) (reaffirming 
the primacy approach and holding that defendant’s state constitutional double jeopardy protections were 
violated). 
 28.  State v. Flick, 495 A.2d 339, 344 (Me. 1985). 
 29.  City of Portland v. Jacobsky, 496 A.2d 646, 648 (Me. 1985). 
 30.  Id. at 648. 
 31.  Id. at 648-49. 
 32.  Id. at 649. 
 33.  Howes, 432 A.2d at 423; Flick, 495 A.2d at 344. 
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guarantees “does not depend on the interpretation of the federal Constitution.”34  In 
other words, state constitutional protection was sui generis, not measured in relation 
to United States Supreme Court case law.35  Nevertheless, in Jacobsky, the Law Court 
refused to consider the meaning of the state constitution independent of the federal 
constitution—declaring, without any analysis—that textual differences were 
immaterial.36   
State constitutionalism continued to wane for the remainder of the decade.  For 
example, in 1988, the Law Court implicitly abandoned the primacy approach by 
examining a plaintiff’s free exercise claim first under the federal constitution and 
then under the state constitution.37   
B. Possible explanations as to why new judicial federalism has stalled in 
Maine  
The Flick opinion was authored by Justice Louis Scolnik, an especially strident 
champion of state constitutionalism.38  Justice Scolnik dissented in Jacobsky.  
Reflecting on that case in retirement, Justice Scolnik explained: “[I]n my dissent, 
and Justice Glassman joined me in that, I wrote that the obscenity ordinance violated 
the Maine constitution.  And the rest of the court didn’t want to deal with the Maine 
constitution.”39  Justice Scolnik retired in 1988.  His absence may explain why some 
of the positive momentum of state constitutionalism stalled. 
  The primacy approach may be to blame, as well.  The first problem with the 
primacy approach is that it incentivizes justices who are leery of state constitutional 
arguments to dispose of them quickly before moving briskly to more familiar 
territory, such as applying U.S. Supreme Court case law.  The easiest way to do that 
is to simply declare that a state constitutional provision is “coextensive” with or 
“identical” to the federal constitution.  Over time, these “coextensive” holdings 
become entrenched. 
                                                                                                     
 34.  Flick, 495 A.2d at 343 (emphasis in original). 
 35.  The best articulation of this principle comes from Justice Linde’s influential work: “The right 
question is not whether a state’s guarantee is the same as or broader than its federal counterpart as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court.  The right question is what the state’s guarantee means and how it 
applies to the case at hand.”  Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus – Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. 
L. REV. 165, 179 (1984).  The Law Court favorably cited Justice Linde’s earlier work in the same vein.  
See Flick, 495 A.2d at 343 n.2 (citing State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316 (Or. 1983) (Linde, J.)); and State 
v. Cadman, 476 A.2d 1120, 1150 (Me. 1984) (citing Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the 
States’ Bill of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379, 383 (1980)). 
 36.  Jacobsky, 496 A.2d at 648-49.  The court did, however, separately analyze the text of the Maine 
Constitution in support of its conclusion that “the equal protection and due process clauses of the two 
Constitutions provide no additional protection in this case beyond that provided by the free exercise 
clauses.”  Blount v. Dep’t of Educ. & Cultural Servs., 551 A.2d 1377, 1385 (Me. 1988).  
 37.  Blount, 551 A.2d at 1379-85 (Me. 1988) (remarkably, the Law Court utilized the state constitution 
to inform the federal constitutional outcome). 
 38.  See, e.g., Duncan v. Ulmer, 159 Me. 266, 270-71, 191 A.2d 617, 620 (1963) (even before he 
ascended to the bench, Justice Scolnik advocated for broad protections under the state constitution). 
 39.  Louis Scolnik, in an interview recorded by Marisa Burnham-Bestor, March 5, 1999, Lewiston, 
Maine.  Transcript available at http://digilib.bates.edu/collect/muskieor/index/assoc/HASH017d.dir/ 
doc.pdf (last viewed Jan. 20, 2016). 
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The other problem with the primacy approach is that it also applies to advocates 
and trial judges.  They, too, are obligated to tackle state constitutional issues head-
on, and first.  And that really is asking a lot; trial judges have tremendous resource 
constraints that make it difficult (if not impossible) for them to chart untested 
constitutional waters in every case where a criminal defendant has asserted his state 
constitutional rights.  The same problem holds true for advocates; the task of drafting 
original state constitutional arguments is equally daunting for them.40  In order for 
the primacy approach to work—and for state constitutionalism to thrive—appellate 
courts have to provide ample guidance about what the state constitutional protections 
entail.  If an appellate court is unwilling to consistently and thoroughly engage on 
state constitutional questions, then lower court judges and lawyers will question 
whether crafting those arguments is worth the effort.  If it is not, then advocates will 
stop making those arguments; lower courts will not rule on them; and state 
constitutional arguments will not ascend to appellate courts.  Over time, the cycle of 
avoidance will become engrained. 
State constitutionalism may have petered out in Maine, but the news is not all 
bad.  A revival of state constitutional law is still possible.  There are ample doctrinal41 
and utilitarian42 reasons in favor of state constitutional avoidance, but the court has 
never seriously discussed them.  Thus, Maine has not foreclosed the possibility of a 
state constitutional revival.  In fact, the Law Court has hinted that it is ready to 
reexamine its search and seizure case law and decide anew whether the state 
constitution offers broader protection than the federal constitution.43  Advocates 
should encourage this effort. 
II. 
Step 2:  Motivate the Court to independently interpret the state constitutional 
search and seizure clause 
It is impossible to ignore the elephant in the room.  Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence is “an embarrassment.”44  It is a “mass of contradictions and 
obscurities”45 and “cobbled together from a series of inconsistent and bizarre 
                                                                                                     
 40.  Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States’ Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 
379, 392 (1980) (“[A]n independent argument under the state clause takes homework—in texts, in history, 
in alternative approaches to analysis.”). 
 41.  See, e.g., JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, 
CLAIMS AND DEFENSES, §1.03[4] (collecting commentary). 
 42.  See, e.g., Justin Long, Intermittent State Constitutionalism, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 41, 96-99 (2006) 
(identifying pragmatic reasons why state constitutionalism has lacked a strong foothold in the vast 
majority of American states). 
 43.  State v. Hutchinson, 2009 ME 44, ¶ 18 n.9, 969 A.2d 923 (“Although this provision and the 
corresponding provision in the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution generally offer 
identical protection, we have also recognized that the Maine Constitution may offer additional 
protections.”) (internal citations omitted); State v. Glover, 2014 ME 49, ¶ 10 n.2, 89 A.3d 1077 (same).  
 44.  Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 757 (1994). 
 45.  Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1468 (1985). 
330 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:2 
 
results”46 which the Court does not even bother to defend.47  Former and current 
members of the Court readily acknowledge that problems exist.  Justice Harlan 
believed that “the law of search and seizure is due for an overhauling”48 and Justice 
Scalia said that he “hate[d]” Fourth Amendment cases.49  Why then would any state 
court purposefully tether itself to the U.S. Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence on a matter of state constitutional concern?  State constitutionalism in 
the search and seizure context has plenty of intuitive appeal. 
The Law Court is right to tinker with the idea of a state constitutional revival for 
search and seizure issues for another reason.  Search and seizure law has moved well 
beyond automobiles and pen registers.  Today, courts are inundated with complicated 
questions about privacy and the continuing validity of the third-party doctrine, and 
computer searches.  Over time, these questions will only increase in frequency and 
complexity.  By design, the U.S. Supreme Court will be much slower to provide 
answers than state high courts, and answers are sorely needed.  Computers are 
ubiquitous.  Beat-level cops need to know what to do with them and citizens need to 
know whether any expectation of computing privacy exists. 
Even if one wanted to, a state high court may not have the luxury of waiting to 
hear what the U.S. Supreme Court will say.  Courts that have thus far either ignored 
or adopted a lockstep approach to state constitutional law—expressly or by default—
may be pressed to chart an independent course.   
Of course, courts may be pressed into action regardless of whether they want to 
ground the source of authority for their decisions in their state constitutions or 
guesswork about what the federal constitution might protect.  But, courts that want 
to avoid being reversed,50 and criminal defense attorneys advocating for the broadest 
possible protections for their clients, will pick the former over the latter. 
Simply declaring that the state and federal constitutions are “coextensive” or 
“identical,” as the Law Court has done, is no panacea.  “Coextensive” is not a 
constitutional default; rather, it is an affirmative statement of the law which, like 
everything else, demands support.  In criminal procedure cases implicating state 
constitutional guarantees, lawyers on both sides must engage in state constitutional 
research and analysis, and a court, through its own examination, must decide which 
side has the better argument.  “Win or lose, state constitutional arguments must still 
be considered and analyzed.”51  State constitutional construction is simply 
                                                                                                     
 46.  Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 
476, 480 (2011). 
 47.  Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional 
Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 28 (1988). 
 48.  Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 490 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 49.  Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, in an interview recorded 
by Susan Swain, June 19, 2009, Washington, D.C. Transcript, http://www.c-span.org/video/?286079-
1/supreme-court-justice-scalia (last viewed Jan. 20, 2016). 
 50.  Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) (“If the state court decision indicates clearly and 
expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds, we, of 
course, will not undertake to review the decision.”). 
 51.  Robert F. Williams, The New Judicial Federalism in Ohio: The First Decade, 51 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 415, 420 (2004). 
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unavoidable and, in a jurisdiction like Maine, most, but not all, of that work will be 
original.   
The task is not as daunting as it sounds.  Advocates and judges have no need to 
fear either originalism or the balancing of contemporary values. 
A. History and originalism 
There is no need for anyone to spend weeks cramped in dusky archives.  In the 
search and seizure context, history provides a justification for an independent state 
constitutional analysis, and it suggests whether the state constitution confers broader 
protections, but it will not supply any meaningful answers about the “right” legal 
outcome.  The lively discussion in academic circles about the merits of an originalist 
approach to search and seizure issues52 should not dissuade front-line lawyers and 
judges—who anyways lack the time and resources to examine the intricacies of 
nineteenth century common law—from advancing state constitutional arguments.  
The historical argument is most relevant to the binary question of whether a state 
constitutional provision confers greater rights than the federal counterpart, not what 
that protection precisely entails. 
For example, suppose a court must decide whether the Bangor Police 
Department needs a warrant to search for text messages maintained by a foreign 
corporation on a server outside the United States.  History informs whether the state 
constitution offers greater privacy protections than the federal constitution, but a 
historical analysis will not “solve” the problem.  The right “answer” to the case does 
not lay buried in antiquated case law or custom. 
Nevertheless, judges almost certainly take comfort in historically-based 
arguments for pragmatic reasons: decisions anchored by a historical analysis may be 
perceived by the public as more legitimate, and may better insulate a judge from 
public accusations of judicial rulemaking.53  This concern is particularly acute in 
cases recognizing broader constitutional protections for criminal defendants.54  But, 
historical arguments only go so far.  Judges who would deny more generous privacy 
protections equally open themselves to attack for trying to analogize modern 
technological innovations to some nineteenth century relic.  Judges who attempt this 
feat do so at their own peril.55 
                                                                                                     
 52.  See, e.g., Amar, supra note 10; Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A 
Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. REV. 925 (1997); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 
107 HARV. L. REV. 820 (1994); David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 1739 (2000). 
 53.  See Katharine Goodloe, A Study in Unaccountability: Judicial Elections and Dependent State 
Constitutional Interpretations, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 749, 790 (“State courts are significantly 
more likely to adopt dependent interpretations when judges face election, and significantly more likely to 
adopt independent interpretations when they do not.”); Sklansky, supra note 52, at 1772 (Constitutional 
originalism legitimizes results by “attributing outcomes not to unelected judges but to the collective 
determination of an older and particularly revered generation.”). 
 54.  United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 55.  This problem is not shared by other criminal procedure guarantees.  For example, in Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004), the Court traced the origins of the Confrontation Clause “to Roman 
times,” and that was appropriate because cross-examination is in no sense innovative. 
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B. Balancing contemporary values 
More to the point, search and seizure jurisprudence—at least in the Fourth 
Amendment context—reflects the balancing of competing interests.56  And the nature 
of those interests, and whether they are furthered by the challenged law enforcement 
activity, are evaluated considering contemporary concerns.57  For example, when 
deciding whether a person has a “legitimate expectation of privacy,” the Court has 
accounted for the fact that the search occurred in a “public school locker room;”58 it 
has considered the “operational realities of the workplace;”59 and it has made 
assumptions about the public’s awareness of the modern booking procedures.60  In 
other words, the inquiry focuses on the present, not the past.   
For better or worse, Fourth Amendment balancing is not objective either.  
Balancing “permits—indeed, requires—judges to rely upon their personal values.”61  
These “values” almost certainly reflect contemporary notions of fairness and justice, 
as well.  Judges who are squeamish about interpreting state constitutional provisions 
using highly subjective methods should be reassured by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
resort to precisely that when discerning the Fourth Amendment’s meaning.  Insofar 
as search and seizure jurisprudence is concerned, decisions that reflect a judge’s 
contemporary, personal predilections are probably unavoidable.62 
Justice Scalia and other members of the Court have at times argued for a 
historical approach to Fourth Amendment questions.63  Once, Justice Scalia, writing 
for a majority of six, declared that in applying the Fourth Amendment, the Court 
must first ask whether the challenged conduct “was regarded as an unlawful search 
or seizure under the common law when the Amendment was framed.”64 But this view 
                                                                                                     
 56.  See Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, 102 GEO. L.J. 1, 11-14 (2013) 
(“[C]ourts have used balancing as the primary tool to determine the scope of the Fourth Amendment, the 
definition of a search, the reasonableness of a search, the reasonableness of a seizure, the meaning of 
probable cause, the level of suspicion required to support stops and detentions, the scope of the 
exclusionary rule, the necessity of obtaining a warrant, and the legality of pretrial detention of juveniles.” 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the 
Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1173, 1178-84 (1988) (documenting the Supreme Court’s increasing use of a Fourth Amendment 
balancing test). 
 57.  See Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 476, 487-88 (2011) (“Equilibrium-adjustment acts as a correction mechanism.  When judges 
perceive that changing technology or social practice significantly weakens police power to enforce the 
law, courts adopt lower Fourth Amendment protections for these new circumstances to help restore the 
status quo ante.  On the other hand, when judges perceive that changing technology or social practice 
significantly enhances government power, courts embrace higher protections to counter the expansion of 
government power.”). 
 58.  Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995). 
 59.  Nat’l Treasury Emps. v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 671 (1989) (citations omitted). 
 60.  Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013). 
 61.  Strossen, supra note 56, at 1184. 
 62.  But see id. at 1208-54 (discussing the least intrusive alternative analysis as a substitute for the 
Court’s balancing approach). 
 63.  See Sklansky, supra note 52, at 1760. 
 64.  Id. (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999)). 
2016] UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 333 
 
has not taken hold since.65  “Reasonableness”—the “touchstone” of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence66— “is not some set of specific rules, frozen in 1791 or 
1868 amber.”67   
Importantly, the Law Court has also hinted that a balancing approach is the 
proper methodology for analyzing the breadth of article I, section 5.  The Court has 
instructed that, “weighing the defendant’s right to be secure in his possessions against 
the interests sought to be advanced by the State, we hold that the search complained 
of does not offend Article I, § 5 of the Maine Constitution.”68  This is utterly 
uncontroversial; again, it is precisely how the U.S. Supreme Court considers search 
and seizure questions.  Unless or until the U.S. Supreme Court fundamentally 
changes its approach to Fourth Amendment issues, the Law Court will almost 
certainly continue to embrace this balancing construct for deciding search and 
seizure issues.  If the Law Court has disdain for the Supreme Court’s balancing 
analysis it has not said so.  This leaves advocates free to expound on modern policy 
concerns, which can be done without much effort and is not as foreign a task as 
pouring over historical texts. 
III. 
Step 3:  Interpret the state constitutional search and seizure clause 
The prevailing view today is that Maine’s search and seizure clause is 
“coextensive” with or “identical” to the Fourth Amendment.  But an in-depth 
examination of Maine’s state constitutional search and seizure jurisprudence shows 
otherwise.   
A. Intuition 
Are the state and federal search and seizure clauses identical?  The question 
seems to answer itself.  Maine’s search and seizure clause is textually different than 
the Fourth Amendment.69  The clauses were not drafted simultaneously (not even 
close), nor were they drafted by the same authors.  The purpose for each clause is 
markedly different: the Fourth Amendment limits the federal government; article I, 
section 5 operates as a limitation on state actors.  Even post-Incorporation, the 
function of each clause remains distinct.  Whereas the Fourth Amendment embodies 
bottom-line constitutional safeguards that reflect federalism concerns, thereby 
empowering states to decide for themselves whether additional protections might 
                                                                                                     
 65.  Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave Fourth Amendment 
History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REV. 895, 930 (2002) (in Fourth Amendment cases, the Justices “consult 
history on a selective, rather than a systematic, basis and remain unsettled about the influence of history 
when determining the meaning and scope of the Amendment”). 
 66.  See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). 
 67.  Amar, supra note 10, at 818. At most, the definition of “reasonableness” “may be guided”—but 
not controlled—“by the meaning ascribed to it by the Framers of the Amendment.”  Wilson v. Arkansas, 
514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995). 
 68.  State v. Dubay, 338 A.2d 797, 798 (Me. 1975). 
 69.  Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV, with ME. CONST. art. I § 5. 
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exist for their own citizens; article I, section 5 is intended to do precisely that: reflect 
the rights of “the people of Maine” in order to “provide for our mutual defense, 
promote our common welfare, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings 
of liberty . . . .”70  The historical record, though scant, does nothing to contradict the 
strong intuition that the two constitutions are not “identical.” 
The Act of Separation of 1819 granted Maine’s independence from 
Massachusetts.  The creation and adoption of a constitution was a prerequisite for 
statehood, and on October 11, 1819, 274 delegates assembled at the Cumberland 
County courthouse in Portland to draft that document.71  The delegates chose William 
King to preside, and he in turn appointed thirty-three delegates to a committee to 
draft the constitution.72  The committee completed its work within a week.73  The 
Constitutional Convention adopted the committee’s draft with only a few changes, 
unrelated to the search and seizure clause.74 
The committee’s quick work was made possible, at least in part, because 
members borrowed heavily from other constitutions: Connecticut, Delaware, 
Indiana, Kentucky, New Hampshire, and the United States.75  Importantly, the 
committee considered sources other than the federal constitution.  Article I, section 
5 is a manifestation of the committee’s insular focus: to decide the breadth of 
constitutional protection afforded to Mainers, considering the particular concerns 
and anxieties of Maine citizens.  It is not surprising or even remarkable that Mainers 
shared many of the concerns of their nation-wide brethren.  This does not mean, 
however, that the concerns were identical. 
Perhaps the most convincing evidence that Maine’s search and seizure clause is 
not “identical” in meaning to the Fourth Amendment is that for nearly 150 years— 
between the grant of statehood in 1820 and incorporation in 1961—Maine courts 
were forced to develop their own search and seizure jurisprudence apart from any 
federal guarantee.  Law Court decisions from that era unambiguously reveal robust 
privacy protections, mandated by the state constitution.  And these rights are not 
measured—or somehow limited—either by the Fourth Amendment or U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions from the same era about search and seizure issues, generally.  U.S. 
Supreme Court case law was not consulted at all.   
The breadth of article I, section 5 protections was largely—and most notably—
defined by Maine’s pioneering temperance movement.  Maine passed a variety of 
different statutes to further that aim, nearly all of which were tested against the 
guarantees protected by the state constitution.  By approving or disapproving of 
various statutory enactments, vague constitutional outlines begin to appear.  More 
important than that, however, is the methodology the court used for analyzing the 
constitutionality of the statutes, and the overall tone of the opinions.  This informs 
the general strength of the right at stake. 
                                                                                                     
 70.  ME. CONST. preamble (emphasis added). 
 71.  MARSHALL J. TINKLE, THE MAINE STATE CONSTITUTION 4-5 (2nd ed. 2013). 
 72.  Id. at 5. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. at 7. 
 75.  Id. at 6-7. 
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B. Statehood to Incorporation 
1. Balancing and accounting for contemporary life 
One salient feature of these early cases is the court’s willingness to describe and 
weigh the significance of the right implicated by a search or seizure against the 
practical limitations facing magistrates and justices of the peace.  This augurs in 
favor of an article I, section 5 “reasonableness” analysis that balances Maine-specific 
concerns.   
For example, recognizing the difficulty of distinguishing between legally and 
illegally possessed liquor (which turned on what the owner intended to do with it), 
the court in 1852 relaxed the particularity requirement, noting that the constitution 
was not designed “to prevent the accomplishment of any useful purpose, by searches 
and seizures” and that the framers did not intend “to require a designation of the thing 
to be searched for, so special and particular as to prevent the accomplishment for any 
beneficial purpose by a search-warrant.”76  This sentiment may have state-friendly 
overtones, but the court did not always tack that way. 
Balancing cut in the opposite direction when the search of a home was at issue; 
the court believed that privacy interests there are unsurpassed.77  In 1925, Maine had 
little difficulty embracing the Castle Doctrine and extending it to the curtilage 
surrounding the home78—relying on English common law and other states as sources 
of authority, without regard for federal case law on the subject.79 
Importantly, when considering the nature and significance of the right at stake, 
Maine never looked to federal courts for answers.  For example, in 1908, the court 
sustained exceptions to a warrant authorizing a search of “a valise alleged merely to 
be in the possession of the defendant, but not alleged to be in any definite and fixed 
locality or place.”80  If there was corollary federal case law at the time about the 
particularity requirement for, or the privacy interests imbued in, mobile objects, the 
court did not cite it. 
Since 1880, Maine has held that the state’s limited power to infringe upon the 
privacy and possessory interests of its citizens “is an extraordinary one, and can only 
                                                                                                     
 76.  State v. Robinson, 33 Me. 564, 572-73 (1852). 
 77.  Flaherty v. Longley, 62 Me. 420, 422 (1873); State v. Duane, 100 Me. 447, 62 A. 80 (1905) 
(particularity requirement strictly construed where warrant could be read to authorize the search of three 
homes); State v. Brann, 109 Me. 559, 84 A. 266 (1912). 
 78.  Marshall v. Wheeler, 124 Me. 324, 128 A. 692 (1925) (recognizing that a shed, connected with 
the house and used for household purposes falls within the “curtilage” of the “dwelling house”). 
 79.  See Brendan Peters, Note, Fourth Amendment Yard Work: Curtilage’s Mow-Line Rule, 56 STAN. 
L. REV. 943, 952-58 (2004).  The concept of curtilage was prevalent in English common law and in early 
American cases.  See e.g. Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1603).  Curtilage—more 
specifically, structures within the curtilage—were first recognized within the ambit of Fourth Amendment 
protection in Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 314-17 (1921).  But, it was not until dictum in Oliver 
v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 188 (1984), that the curtilage includes not only structures, but also the land 
surrounding the house. 
 80.  State v. Fezzette, 103 Me. 467, 471, 69 A. 1073, 1075 (1908); cf. State v. Knowlton, 70 Me. 200, 
201 (1879) (warrant alleging that intoxicating liquors were kept “in a certain wagon on the fair ground on 
the easterly side of Union Hall, in Searsport,” was sufficiently particular) (quotations omitted). 
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be justified on the ground that the public good and the prevention of crime require 
it.”81  This is paradigmatic balancing. 
2. Narrow exception(s) to the warrant requirement 
In 1852, Maine recognized that Article I, section 5 did not “forbid the arrest of 
deserters from the army without warrants.”82  Other recognized exceptions are more 
difficult to discern.  None of Maine’s early cases permit a warrantless search for 
incriminating evidence.  However, Maine may have recognized a very “jealously 
guarded”83 exception to the warrant requirement for the seizure of evidence. 
Early Maine cases do not expressly repudiate what we now think of as the plain-
view exception to the warrant requirement, but early courts took great care to protect 
possessory interests and were deeply concerned when property was seized without a 
warrant.  Again, the court did so recognizing the importance of those interests to 
Mainers and without mention of any federal authority.  For example, in 1854, the 
court held that a warrant authorizing the seizure of liquor did not also implicitly 
authorize the seizure of the casks or vessels that held the liquor; the justice of the 
peace was not authorized to seize or destroy the vessels.84   
Troubled by the fact that a Kennebec County deputy sheriff seized the plaintiff’s 
beer without a warrant, and worried about the possibility of spoilage in the “hot 
summer weather,” the court in 1880 declared:  
What is a reasonable time to enable the officer to procure a warrant, must be 
determined by the facts of the case; but when no sufficient reason is given for longer 
delay, we think it should not exceed twenty-four hours from the time of seizure.85  
Because the deputy sheriff held the beer for six days, he was liable for conversion 
and ordered to pay for the cost of the beer, plus interest.86   
The court reached the same result in 1920, in a case involving the Game 
Warden’s seizure of a bull moose.  Because the warden seized the moose without a 
warrant, and did nothing thereafter to bring suit or take steps to give the plaintiff a 
hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction, the warden was “an acknowledged 
trespasser ab initio . . . holding the property without any legal authority or 
justification whatever.”87  These cases also plainly suggest that article I, section 5 
confers no inherent authority on an officer to undertake any search or seizure wholly 
                                                                                                     
 81.  Weston v. Carr, 71 Me. 356, 357-58 (1880). 
 82.  Hutchings v. Van Bokkelen, 34 Me. 126, 131 (1852). 
 83.  Woods v. Perkins, 119 Me. 257, 261, 110 A. 633, 636 (1920) (Article I, section 5 embodies a 
“fundamental principle of civil liberty [that] still subsists, and must be jealously guarded by the courts 
against invasion.”). 
 84.  Black v. McGilvery, 38 Me. 287, 288-89 (1854). 
 85.  Weston v. Carr, 71 Me. 356, 358 (1880); State v. Riley, 86 Me. 144, 146, 29 A. 920, 920 (1893) 
(“Waiting eight days after a seizure is made before process is obtained whereby to justify the seizure is 
unreasonable.”). But see State v. Nadeau, 97 Me. 275, 276, 54 A. 725, 726 (Me. 1903) (Where the 
defendant was arrested 23 days after the arrest warrant issued, “[t]he report of the evidence does not 
warrant the finding that the officer was either dilatory or negligent in obtaining or serving the warrant.”). 
 86.  Weston, 71 Me. at 358. 
 87.  Woods v. Perkins, 119 Me. 257, 262, 110 A. 633, 636 (1920). 
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outside the warrant process. 
At best, these cases reveal a very limited exception to the warrant requirement.  
The state may seize evidence, but within 24 hours thereafter, they must test the 
constitutionality of that seizure through the warrants process.  This is markedly 
different than the Fourth Amendment’s strictures, which impose no obligation on the 
part of the government to obtain a warrant authorizing the seizure post hoc.88 
3. Exclusionary rule 
It is no surprise that some early cases interpreting article I, section 5 reject the 
exclusion of evidence as a remedy for an unlawful search or seizure.89  There was no 
need to exclude evidence because the accused had an alternative way to vindicate his 
interests and remedy his loss: a civil suit for trespass.  Time and again, Maine refused 
to exclude evidence because of this other avenue of litigation.  For example, in 1873, 
the court in State v. McCann90 explained: “If the sheriff has violated any law he is 
responsible for such violation . . . .  A severance is made by law and in the proceeding 
against the person, it is immaterial what has been done with the thing.”91  In 1874, 
the court reiterated in State v. Plunkett: “If the search warrant were illegal, or if the 
officer serving the warrant exceeded his authority, the party on whose complaint the 
warrant issued, or the officer, would be responsible for the wrong done; but this is 
no good reason for excluding the papers seized as evidence . . . .”92  
However, early case law also holds that a court may exclude evidence to remedy 
a state constitutional violation.  In State v. Riley,93 the officer seized liquors without 
a warrant and delayed for more than twenty-four hours to procure a warrant and was, 
therefore, liable as a trespasser to the owner of the liquors for their value.94  
Nevertheless, in 1893, the court explained that the failure to exclude unlawfully 
obtained evidence would lead to an absurd result: 
It would surely be an odd spectacle to see an owner of liquors punished for having 
such liquors in his possession for an illegal purpose, and the officer also punished 
for seizing the liquors from him under a pretended form of law.  The two things do 
not seem consistent with each other.95 
                                                                                                     
 88.  See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (discussing the limitations of the 
plain-view exception; no mention is made of post hoc authorization for the initial seizure through the 
warrants process). 
 89.  State v. McCann, 61 Me. 116, 117-18 (1873) (“It is objected that the seizure was illegal, the 
officer having proceeded to search without any warrant.  Suppose it was so, that is no defense for the 
defendant’s violation of law.  If the sheriff has violated any law he is responsible for such violation, but 
that will not constitute any justification or excuse for the defendant.”); State v. Plunkett, 64 Me. 534, 537-
38 (1874); State v. Burroughs, 72 Me. 480, 481 (1881); State v. Schoppe, 113 Me. 10, 16, 92 A. 867, 869 
(1915).  
 90.  McCann, 61 Me. at 117-18. 
 91.  Id. at 118. 
 92.  Plunkett, 64 Me. at 537. 
 93.  State v. Riley, 86 Me. 144, 29 A. 920 (1893). 
 94.  Id. at 920. 
 95.  Id. 
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The court noted that, “[a] seizure proceeding without an actual seizure would be an 
anomaly.  And an illegal seizure is no seizure.”96 
When the evidence was not suppressed, and the accused was forced to avail 
himself of a civil remedy, the court often did not hesitate to find against a sheriff, 
even if he was acting under the authority of a warrant.  Generally, “[i]t was no part 
of the officer’s duty to examine into and decide upon the constitutionality or 
construction of the statute which authorized his warrant,”97 but in 1880, it was also 
true that a warrant could be “so irregular and insufficient upon its face as to afford 
no protection to the officer who proceeded to make an arrest upon it.”98  In other 
words, liability for trespass was real, not illusory.    
The common thread running through this grouping of cases is reassurance that 
some mechanism existed—exclusion or trespass—to vindicate the violation of the 
accused’s constitutional rights.  Deterrence of police misconduct, the current 
rationale for the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule,99 is the intended consequence 
of civil liability, but there is no reason to presume that deterrence is the only rationale 
for the article I, section 5 exclusionary rule.  Some current members of the Law Court 
have already recognized this, albeit in the context of confessions: 
[T]he judicially-crafted exclusionary rule arising from the due process clauses of 
our state and federal constitutions was created to deter improper conduct by the State 
and to prevent the State from using its ill-gotten gains against a citizen.100   
The different motivations behind the state and federal exclusionary rules provides 
further proof that the search and seizure clauses are not “identical.”  In fact, the state 
constitution offers greater protection.  There is no reason the Law Court must follow 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s exclusionary rule jurisprudence lockstep.  Doing so denies 
the importance of these early cases. 
C. Incorporation to 1990 
As was true with state constitutionalism generally, the Law Court was already 
hard at work interpreting the state constitutional search and seizure clause before any 
academic call for new judicial federalism.101  After the U.S. Supreme Court decided 
in Mapp v. Ohio102 that Fourth Amendment protections were enforceable against the 
States, the Law Court was forced to grapple with the relationship between the state 
and federal constitutional search and seizure clauses.  From 1961 to 1980, the Law 
Court published twenty-five opinions that contained references to both the Fourth 
                                                                                                     
 96.  Id. 
 97.  State v. McNally, 34 Me. 210, 221 (1852). 
 98.  Harwood v. Siphers, 70 Me. 464, 467 (1880). 
 99.  United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1987). 
 100.  State v. Rees, 2000 ME 55, ¶ 44, 748 A.2d 976 (Saufley, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 101.  See William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. 
REV. 489, 502 (1977), discussed supra in text accompanying note 167. 
 102.  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). 
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Amendment and Maine’s state constitutional analogue: article I, section 5.103 
The best that can be said is that the independence of Maine’s search and seizure 
clause survived the 1970s and 1980s battered, but intact.  The Law Court did not 
articulate any broader state constitutional protections, but it refrained from lockstep 
adoption of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence for state constitutional purposes.  Still, 
the primacy approach that the court utilized in other state constitutional criminal 
procedure contexts was never meaningfully extended to search and seizure cases.   
In 1970, the Law Court mentioned the primacy rule in a search and seizure case 
for the first time—and then immediately and forever thereafter ignored it.  In State 
v. Hawkins,104 the court remarked: “While in the first instance, the legality of a search 
and seizure must be determined under State law, the State standard can be no lower 
than the constitutional standards applicable to the proceedings in the Federal Courts 
and under Federal prosecutions.”105  The court then proceeded to analyze the case by 
exclusive reference to U.S. Supreme Court case law, while hinting that the state 
constitution might actually confer less individual protection.106 
In 1973, the Law Court made clear in State v. Heald107 that it would not read the 
state constitutional Fourth Amendment analogue as expansively as it had the Fifth 
Amendment analogue, at least insofar as the remedy of evidentiary exclusion was 
concerned: because there was no textual support for doing so; Mapp aimed “to 
compel consistency” between state and federal criminal procedure; and because the 
court was “not persuaded” that the state constitution required more than what the 
Court held in Mapp.108  The court offered no explanation as to why it was not 
persuaded. 
In 1975, the court issued a trio of decisions concerning the relationship between 
the state and federal search and seizure protections.  In State v. Caron,109 a lone 
dissenting Justice suggested that the court should interpret the state constitutional 
search and seizure clause to reflect “the public policy of this State,” including its 
                                                                                                     
 103.  The Law Court mentioned article I, section 5 of the Maine Constitution and the Fourth 
Amendment together in the same decision twenty-five times before 1980: State v. MacKenzie, 161 Me. 
123, 210 A.2d 24 (Me. 1965); State v. Howe, 219 A.2d 116 (Me. 1966); State v. Brochu, 237 A.2d 418 
(Me. 1967); State v. Warner, 237 A.2d 150 (Me. 1967); Opinion of the Justices, 255 A.2d 643 (Me. 1969); 
State v. Cadigan, 249 A.2d 750 (Me. 1969); State v. Martelle, 252 A.2d 316 (Me. 1969); State v. Chapman, 
250 A.2d 203 (Me. 1969); State Liquor Comm’n v. Gilbert, 270 A.2d 876 (Me. 1970); State v. Hawkins, 
261 A.2d 255 (Me. 1970); State v. Hollander, 289 A.2d 419 (Me. 1972); State v. Smith, 277 A.2d 481 
(Me. 1971); State v. O’Clair, 292 A.2d 186 (Me. 1972); State v. Stone, 294 A.2d 683 (Me. 1972); State v. 
Heald, 314 A.2d 820 (Me. 1973); State v. Barlow, 320 A.2d 895 (Me. 1974); State v. Koucoules, 343 A.2d 
860 (Me. 1974); State v. Thibodeau, 317 A.2d 172 (Me. 1974); State v. Caron, 334 A.2d 495 (Me. 1975); 
State v. Hamm, 348 A.2d 268 (Me. 1975); State v. Paris, 343 A.2d 588 (Me. 1975); State v. Dubay, 338 
A.2d 797 (Me. 1975); State v. Foisy, 384 A.2d 42 (Me. 1978); State v. Parkinson, 389 A.2d 1 (Me. 1978); 
State v. Fredette, 411 A.2d 65 (Me. 1979).  
 104.  State v. Hawkins, 261 A.2d 255 (Me. 1970). 
 105.  Id. at 257. 
 106.  See id. at 258; see also State v. Brochu, 237 A.2d 418, 424 (Me. 1967) (noting that the Supremacy 
Clause obligated Maine to adhere to the federal exclusionary rule, but searching for ways to avoid its 
application). 
 107.  State v. Heald, 314 A.2d 820 (Me. 1973). 
 108.  Id. at 829. 
 109.  State v. Caron, 334 A.2d 495 (Me. 1975). 
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“intended high priority commitment” that article I, section 5 embody “full 
protection” from “the fruits of all unreasonable searches and seizures . . . in any 
proceeding.”110  In State v. Dubay,111 the court, perhaps unintentionally, suggested a 
methodology—balancing—for deciding the breadth of the state constitutional search 
and seizure clause: “[W]eighing the defendant’s right to be secure in his possessions 
against the interests sought to be advanced by the State, we hold that the search 
complained of does not offend Article I, § 5 of the Maine Constitution.”112  And in 
State v. Paris,113 the court took a huge step backwards when it framed the issue 
thusly: “[W]e are called upon to decide . . . whether this Court, in interpreting Article 
I, Section 5 of the Constitution of Maine, will deviate from the United States 
Supreme Court’s interpretations of the federal Constitution . . . .”114  This, of course, 
is a far cry from the primacy approach and the notion that the state constitutional 
guarantee is sui generis.   
In 1979, the court admonished, again without any discussion, in State v. 
Fredette,115 that it would not suppress evidence under the state constitution if the 
evidence would not have been suppressed under the federal constitution as a matter 
of “established policy.”116 
State constitutionalism, in the search and seizure context, did not improve in the 
following decade.  Between 1980 and 1990, the Law Court had 14 opportunities to 
analyze the breadth of article I, section 5.117  Interestingly, two such cases returned 
to the Law Court on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court for consideration in light 
of evolving Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.118  But, this obvious instability in 
federal constitutional law did nothing to move the Law Court to develop its own 
search and seizure jurisprudence. 
In 1981 and 1982, the Law Court made no attempt to disentangle state and 
                                                                                                     
 110.  Id. at 507 (Dufresne, J., dissenting). 
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 113.  State v. Paris, 343 A.2d 588 (Me. 1975). 
 114.  Id. at 589. 
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 116.  See id. at 67. 
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952 (Me. 1984); State v. Cote, 518 A.2d 454, 455 n.1 (Me. 1986).  The Law Court mentioned Article I, 
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Clark, 420 A.2d 240 (Me. 1980); State v. Sweatt, 427 A.2d 940 (Me. 1981).  See State v. Peakes, 440 A.2d 
350 (Me. 1982); State v. Bouchles, 457 A.2d 798 (Me. 1983); State v. Patten, 457 A.2d 806 (Me. 1983); 
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Inland Fisheries and Wildlife, 566 A.2d 737 (Me. 1989); State v. Patterson, 582 A.2d 1204 (Me 1990).  
 118.  See State v. Patten, 457 A.2d 806, 807 (Me. 1983) (on remand for reconsideration in light of 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)); State v. Thornton, 485 A.2d 952 (Me. 1984) (on remand for 
consideration in light of Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984)). 
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federal constitutional interpretation on search and seizure issues.119  Then, in 1983, 
the court decided its most important decision to date about the relationship between 
the state constitutional analogue, article I, section 5, and the Fourth Amendment.   
In State v. Bouchles, the Law Court held that the newly-recognized “closed-
container” component of the “automobile exception” to the Fourth Amendment’s 
warrant requirement announced in United States v. Ross,120 also existed under the 
state constitution.121  The court whipsawed between reasons for and against tacking 
closely to the Fourth Amendment: 
[W]e reject any straitjacket approach by which we would automatically adopt the 
federal construction of the fourth amendment ban of “unreasonable searches and 
seizures” as the meaning of the nearly identical provision of the Maine Constitution.  
On the other hand, the absence of Maine authority on the issue forces us to seek 
guidance from the precedents of other jurisdictions, including the federal, construing 
their similar constitutional search-and-seizure clauses.  Furthermore, we cannot be 
blind to the immense body of fourth amendment precedent in both state and federal 
courts.  Nor can we ignore the experience of the Supreme Court that culminated in 
its Ross decision, groping for a rule that would give law enforcement officers and 
courts clear guidance and at the same time preserve the limits imposed by history 
upon the Carroll exception for automobile searches.  This court has had its own 
share of difficulty in following the doctrinal meanderings of the federal “closed 
container exception” to the Carroll rule. 122 
The court concluded: “While we acknowledge a duty to declare independently the 
meaning of the search-and-seizure clause of the Maine Constitution, we should not 
plunge down doctrinal trails in disregard of the lessons of the federal experience.”123 
The court seems to have reached that conclusion with some reluctance, but also 
a good deal of relief—gratitude, even—that it could heavily rely on the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s “helpful guides” and avoid forging ahead alone.   
The court decided State v. Patten the same day as Bouchles, and these 
companion cases raised identical issues.124  Instead of repeating what it had said in 
Bouchles, the Law Court summarized it this way: 
For the reasons stated . . . in . . . Bouchles . . . , we hold that a warrantless search of 
a vehicle for contraband, that is constitutionally permissible under the long-
established “automobile exception,” may be validly extended to a container, found 
in the vehicle, that is capable of containing the contraband.  In this regard we find 
no reason to construe article I, section 5 of the State Constitution any differently that 
                                                                                                     
 119.  State v. Sweatt, 427 A.2d 940, 945 (Me. 1981) (“This Court has never interpreted the Maine 
Constitution differently from the United States Constitution on the issue of standing to bring a motion to 
suppress.”); State v. Peakes, 440 A.2d 350, 353 (Me. 1982) (“[T]he description [of the place to be 
searched] in the affidavit provides the necessary reasonable certainty required under our previous 
interpretations of Article I, § 5 of the Maine Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.”). 
 120.  United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
 121.  See State v. Bouchles, 457 A.2d 798, 799 (Me. 1983). 
 122.  Id. at 801-02 (citations omitted). 
 123.  Id. at 802. 
 124.  State v. Patten, 457 A.2d 806, 807 (Me. 1983). 
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the fourth amendment of the federal constitution.125 
The Law Court stretched Patten far beyond its original meaning in the resulting 
decades by repeatedly citing an excerpt of that passage—“we find no reason to 
construe article I, section 5 of the State Constitution any differently than the fourth 
amendment to the federal constitution”—in search and seizure cases raising a variety 
of different questions. 
After Bouchles and Patten, the court’s next search and seizure case to mention 
the state constitution, State v. Griffin, did so only in passing and in the context of an 
“investigatory stop” on the street.126  Despite the decision’s paucity of analysis, 
successive courts also cited it, like Patten, for the proposition that the state and 
federal constitutional guarantees were synonymous in other search and seizure 
iterations.127   
State constitutional search and seizure case law in the 1980s ended on a 
decidedly low point in 1987, with State v. Marquis.128  The Law Court found no 
Fourth Amendment violation; ignored whether a violation might have occurred 
under the state constitution; and therefore declared it “unnecessary to decide the issue 
whether there is a separate exclusionary rule under article I, section 5 of the Maine 
Constitution.”129 
Importantly, with the exception of Bouchles, in the 1970s and 1980s, the court 
never explained why the result was the same under the state and federal constitutions.  
If the court was seriously concerned about any of the doctrinal criticisms of state 
constitutionalism, it never let on.  
D. 1991 to the present 
The Law Court’s treatment of state constitutional search and seizure issues in 
the 1970s and 1980s gave advocates no reason to push for the recognition of broader 
protections.  Not surprising, from 1991 to the present, the Law Court has had only 
thirty-eight occasions to consider the meaning of the state constitutional search and 
seizure clause.  The result can only be described as a full-scale retreat from the state 
                                                                                                     
 125.  Id. at 811 (emphasis added). 
 126.  State v. Griffin, 459 A.2d 1086, 1089 (Me. 1983) (“The Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 5 of our Maine Constitution do require that the officer’s objective 
observations, coupled with any relevant information he may have, together with the rational inferences 
and deductions he may draw and make from the totality of the circumstances, be sufficient to reasonably 
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omitted). 
 127.  See, e.g., State v. Fillion, 474 A.2d 187, 189 (Me. 1984) (investigatory stop); State v. Thurlow, 
485 A.2d 960, 963 (Me. 1984) (investigatory stop); State v. Caron, 534 A.2d 978, 978 (Me. 1987) 
(automobile seizure); State v. Pelletier, 541 A.2d 1296, 1296 (Me. 1988) (automobile seizure); State v. 
Pinkham, 565 A.2d 318, 319 (Me. 1989) (automobile seizure); Hatfield v. Comm’r of Inland Fisheries 
and Wildlife, 566 A.2d 737, 740 (Me. 1989) (“riverblock” operation); State v. Patterson, 582 A.2d 1204, 
1206 (Me. 1990) (automobile roadblock). 
 128.  State v. Marquis, 525 A.2d 1041 (Me. 1987). 
 129.  Id. at 1043. 
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constitutionalism of the early 1980s.130 
Overwhelmingly—twenty-five times—the Law Court simultaneously 
mentioned article I, section 5 and the Fourth Amendment, and then applied either 
Supreme Court case law, Maine case law interpreting United States Supreme Court 
case law, or both, without any recognition or discussion of a possible distinction 
between the two constitutional provisions.  Often, the court expressly decided the 
Fourth Amendment question and altogether ignored the state constitutional issue.131  
Remarkably, the court has done this even while recognizing uncertainty and division 
among lower courts about the correct application of United States Supreme Court 
precedent,132 and also while purporting to balance the competing public policy 
interests at stake in reaching the correct (Fourth Amendment) outcome.133  The 
promising news for state constitutionalists is that the Law Court appears to have 
stopped doing this.134 
Less often—seven times—the Law Court has cited the state and federal search 
and seizure clauses and declared either that they are “coextensive;”135 confer 
“identical”136 protections; or that article I, section 5 confers no broader protection.137  
On one occasion, the court suggested that article I, section 5 offered less protection 
than the Fourth Amendment.138  Twice, recently, the court has suggested—without 
                                                                                                     
 130.  During this same time period, the Law Court has reaffirmed its commitment to broader state 
constitutional protections in other criminal procedure contexts.  See, e.g., State v. Rees, 2000 ME 55, ¶¶ 
5-9, 748 A.2d 976. 
 131.  State v. Tarantino, 587 A.2d 1095 (Me. 1991); State v. Dulac, 600 A.2d 1121 (Me. 1992); State v 
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ME 176, 787 A.2d 135; State v. LaFond, 2002 ME 124, 802 A.2d 425; State v. Tozier, 2006 ME 105, 905 
A.2d 836; State v. Cormier, 2007 ME 112, ¶¶ 44, 57, 928 A.2d 753 (Levy, J., dissenting); State v. Rabon, 
2007 ME 113, 930 A.2d 268; State v. Blackburn, 2008 ME 1148, 960 A.2d 1148; State v. Rees, 2010 ME 
30, 991 A.2d 806; State v. LaPlante, 2011 ME 85, 26 A.3d 337; State v. McPartland, 2012 ME 12, 36 
A.3d 881; State v. Bailey, 2012 ME 55, 41 A.3d 535; State v. LaForge, 2012 ME 65, 43 A.3d 961; State 
v. Whitney, 2012 ME 105, 54 A.3d 1284. 
 132.  See, e.g., O’Rourke, 2001 ME 163, ¶¶ 18-19, 792 A.2d 262. 
 133.  See, e.g., LaForge, 2012 ME 65, ¶ 10, 43 A.3d 961; Whitney, 2012 ME 105, ¶¶ 13-17, 54 A.3d 
1284. 
 134.  The last time the Law Court simultaneously cited both state constitutional search and seizure 
clauses, and then altogether ignored Article I, section 5 was in Whitney, 2012 ME 105, 54 A.3d 1284 
(2012). 
 135.  State v. Gulick, 2000 ME 170, ¶ 9 n.3; 759 A.2d 1085 (identical and coextensive); Clifford v. 
MaineGeneral Med. Ctr., 2014 ME 60, ¶ 67 n.21; 91 A.3d 567 (coextensive); State v. Martin, 2015 ME 
91, ¶ 17 n.2, 120 A.3d 113. 
 136.  State v. Patterson, 2005 ME 26, ¶ 10, 868 A.2d 188; State v. Gorneault, 2007 ME 49, ¶ 6 n.2, 918 
A.2d 1207. 
 137.  State v. Ullring, 1999 ME 183, ¶ 21 n.7, 741 A.2d 1065 (protection not broader); State v. Ireland, 
1998 ME 35, ¶ 6 n.2, 706 A.2d 597 (protection not greater). 
 138.  State v. Hider, 649 A.2d 14, 15 (Me. 1994) (“there is no ‘knock and announce’ requirement in 
Maine”). But see Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995) (holding that the Fourth Amendment 
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further elaboration—that article I, section 5 might confer greater protection than the 
Fourth Amendment.139 
In addition, the Law Court has sporadically presumed that article I, section 5 is 
deserving of its own analysis, at least partially independent from United States 
Supreme Court case law,140 and it has attempted to explain how the state and federal 
guarantees might be different. 
In State v. Melvin,141 the court considered whether the stop and seizure of the 
defendant’s tractor-trailer was constitutional pursuant to the administrative 
inspection exception to the warrant requirement.142  The United States Supreme 
Court set out a three-part test for analyzing the question in New York v. Burger.143  
After analyzing the question under the Fourth Amendment, the court explained: 
Nor do we ignore that our state constitutional analog to the Fourth Amendment—
article I, section 5 of the Maine Constitution—stands as a reminder that, in 
discharging our constitutional responsibilities, we should not rigidly restrict our 
inquiry to the Burger criteria if, by doing so, we fail to account for the core state 
constitutional values that all searches and seizures must not be “unreasonable.”144 
The court then inexplicably concluded that the search was reasonable—under both 
the state and federal constitutions—because it was “based on probable cause and in 
accordance with the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement.”145 
In State v. Trusiani,146 the court held that the defendant’s garage fell within the 
state and federal constitutional protection afforded to the curtilage of a home and, in 
support, it cited to a decision from 1925, in which the court noted that a shed was 
considered part of the dwelling-house at common law.147   
This history—a decidedly mixed bag of mostly superficial state 
constitutionalism and outright state constitutional avoidance—is not unique.148  The 
salient point is that the Law Court has at times attempted, with various degrees of 
                                                                                                     
incorporates the common law requirement that police officers entering a dwelling must knock on the door 
and announce their identity and purpose before attempting forcible entry).   
 139.  State v. Hutchinson, 2009 ME 44, ¶ 18 n.9, 969 A.2d 923 (“Although this provision and the 
corresponding provision in the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution generally offer 
identical protection, we have also recognized that the Maine Constitution may offer additional 
protections.”) (internal citations omitted); State v. Glover, 2014 ME 49, ¶ 10 n.2, 89 A.3d 1077 (same). 
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majority of American states). 
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attention and enthusiasm, to interpret the state constitutional search and seizure 
clause.  While the court has not foreclosed the possibility that the state constitution 
might offer broader protections than the Fourth Amendment, it has not fully 
embraced the idea, either.  In other words, the issue is ripe for additional litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
A pleading in support of broader search and seizure protections under the state 
constitution could follow the outline of this paper.  First, demonstrate to the Law 
Court that predecessor courts have said positive things about state constitutionalism, 
generally.  Second, show that an interpretation of the state constitution does not 
depend on the federal constitution.  Third, assure the court that “reasonableness” and 
the balancing of competing interests is what it should be doing to decide state 
constitutional search and seizure questions.  Fourth, cite cases which demonstrate 
both the independence and more protective nature of the state constitution.  Lastly, 
build on those cases to convince the court to rule favorably on a specific issue.  
Advocates should consider more fundamental questions, too.  Should the Law 
Court abandon the primacy approach?  This idea may seem paradoxical—anathema, 
even—to state constitutional adherents.  But, as discussed infra, the primacy 
approach may do more harm than good.  Maine might borrow the approach used in 
Minnesota.  The Minnesota Supreme Court will independently interpret and apply 
the state constitution if either: (1) the state constitution protects a right that does not 
have an identical or substantially similar federal counterpart; or (2) there is an 
identical or substantially similar federal counterpart, but either the United States 
Supreme Court has made a sharp and radical departure from its precedent or federal 
precedent provides insufficient protection for Minnesota citizens’ basic rights and 
liberties and the Minnesota court does not find a persuasive reason to follow that 
federal precedent.149   
This approach—dubbed “interstitial” or “supplemental” or “state law second”—
has intuitive appeal: if the federal constitution sufficiently protects the individual 
rights at stake, then there is no need to consider whether the state constitution offers 
even greater protection; that just gilds the lily.  This approach keeps the state and 
federal constitutions from becoming entangled—if the individual right is protected 
by the federal constitution, then the analysis ends; the court expresses no opinion on 
the state constitution.  It also keeps state constitutional decisions to a minimum and 
it avoids conflict with federal law.  Other states follow this approach, always or 
occasionally.150 
Advocates should also remind the Law Court that it has already taken the 
hardest, first step.  All it has to do is repeat what it has already done.  The court has 
declared other criminal procedure guarantees to be, not only independent from the 
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federal constitution, but more protective of individual rights.  The public did not 
respond with outrage or indignation.  Mainers, in particular, would be surprised to 
learn that people “from away” are interpreting the Maine state constitution by 
default.  This is especially true when the state constitutional methodology is designed 
to balance local values and interests. 
It is worth repeating that, “[s]tate experimentation with how best to guarantee a 
fair trial to criminal defendants is an essential aspect of our federal scheme.”151  And, 
“[t]hat role is particularly important in the criminal arena because state courts preside 
over many millions more criminal cases than their federal counterparts” and are 
therefore “more likely to identify protections important to a fair trial.”152 
There is no reason to presume that Mainers ever intended—or presently desire—
that the court robustly interpret only some of the state constitutional criminal 
procedure protections.  The Law Court is well-versed in interpreting state 
constitutional guarantees that have no federal constitutional corollary.  It can do the 
same for article I, section 5. 
The Law Court, for its part, should also consider calling for supplemental 
briefing or briefing from interested amici—something that it does on a fairly routine 
basis—if it finds the parties’ state constitutional analysis lacking.  This will further 
two goals: putting the bench on notice that the court expects full briefing on state 
constitutional issues, and ensuring that it has a comprehensive set of arguments prior 
to rendering a decision.  To the extent it has not done so already, this will reinforce 
the court’s unwillingness to relegate state constitutional issues to a single-sentence 
footnote about “identical” or “coextensive” guarantees, in perpetuity. 
Finally, it is true that the “dearth of scholarly analysis . . . has unquestionably 
increased the difficulties that state courts have encountered in their nascent efforts to 
take state constitutional rights seriously.”153  This article aims to do much of that 
preparatory work for article I, section 5 purposes.  But the real heavy-lifting will be 
done by the advocates and judges who, in Maine, have the opportunity to bring about 
a second-wave of new judicial federalism generally, and in the search and seizure 
context, specifically.  These actors have the good fortune and “unparalleled 
opportunity to aid in the formulation of a state constitutional jurisprudence that will 
protect the rights and liberties of our people, however the philosophies of the United 
States Supreme Court may ebb and flow.”154  
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